Index

Lecture series are sponsored by

Prof. Prof. Mallesh Pai (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract: I revisit the optimal auction design problem of Myerson '81. A seller of a single unit of a good wants to design a mechanism to maximize expected revenue from buyers who have independent private values. Buyers also have the option to go to any of k other sellers, each of whom is selling an identical unit of the good by second price auction. Buyers can each visit only one seller, and simultaneously choose which seller to visit after they learn their value and the announced mechanism. I provide novel necessary conditions on the distribution of buyer valuations for the optimal mechanism of the seller to be a second price auction (possibly with a reserve). The conditions naturally bridge the results of Myerson '81 (monopoly seller) and the result of Mcafee '93 (perfect competition). At a technical level, I use optimality conditions from the literature on mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints. This talk is based on work in progress, and therefore there is no paper to circulate.

Short Bio: Mallesh M Pai is a Janice and Julian Bers Assistant Professor in the Social Sciences at the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also an affiliate of the Warren Center for Network and Data Sciences. His research interests include mechanism design/ auction theory, the economics of privacy, social networks/ social learning and statistical decision theory. He has a PhD in Managerial Economics and Strategy from the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and a Bachelor's degree in Computer Science and Engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi.